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Academic scientific research, particularly in genomics, is
becoming increasingly dependent on computers, networks,
and online databases. The future will see a continuing
increase in the number and importance of new discoveries
and insights gained via computational analyses of large
datasets rather than through direct experimentation in a lab-
oratory. Moreover, integrated analysis of multiple distributed
databases will become increasingly important as the number
of online scientific resources continues to rise exponentially
(Greenbaum et al., Nat Biotechnol 2004, 22(6):771-772): the
whole is definitely greater than the sum of its parts.
A direct impediment to the optimal use of online databases
and their interoperation is the increasing prevalence, severity,
and toll of computer and network security incidents. The secu-
rity problem is more common and invasive than commonly
thought. A recent experiment [http://www.usatoday.com/
money/industries/technology/2004-11-29-honeypot_x.htm]
was conducted using  ‘honeypots’ - computers and networks
specifically set up to be attacked in order to collect informa-
tion on the frequency and types of attack. In addition to vali-
dating the protection that firewalls and regular updates of
operating systems can provide (options which are regret-
tably often neglected), the most interesting finding of this
study is the prevalence and frequency of attacks. A computer
is almost guaranteed to be the target of incessant and recur-
rent attacks within minutes of being connected to the inter-
net. The various honeypots in the study were attacked
anywhere from 2 to 341 times per hour. Other previous
studies by the HoneyNet project [http://www.honeynet.org]
have reached similar conclusions [http://www.schneier.com/
crypto-gram-0106.html#1].
To highlight the security problem particularly for academic
genomics research, consider actual intrusion-detection data
provided by the network intrusion detection system SNORT
[http://www.snort.org] that cover the first 198 days of 2002
for a server that hosts a number of commonly used, publicly
available genomics databases and that we feel is typical of
academic genomics server setups. SNORT works by checking
incoming packets of network data against a large database of
likely attack patterns; packets that match patterns in the
database are flagged for the system administrator and
written into logfiles for subsequent analysis. Figure 1a shows
graphs of daily event counts over the first 198 days of 2002.
These data echo the honeypot results:  attempted attacks are
a daily occurrence, with usually around 6-10 per day. In
addition, there is wide variability with some days showing
concerted attempted attacks resulting in hundreds or even
thousands of events. Figure 1b,c shows a breakdown of spe-
cific event types. The frequency and nature of attacks are
unpredictable: on two days that showed a massive spike in
events, a single event type accounted for over 90% of events,
while for another sequence of days with fewer, but more con-
sistent, attacks no single event dominated the SNORT data.
The details of these event types can be found at the SNORT
website [http://www.snort.org]. While intrusion-detection
systems such as SNORT can trigger false positive ‘events’, it
seems likely that at least the most common “SHELLCODE
x86 inc ebx NOOP” events are real attempted attacks, given
that they are used for buffer overflow attacks in attempts to
gain control over machines. (With such buffer overflow
attacks attempts are made to write past the legal boundaries
of allocated computer memory; these are exceptional events
whose consequences might be exploitable by an attacker.) 
If attempted attacks are incessant, successful attacks are also
relatively common. The clearest demonstration of this is the
often-publicized and seemingly endless stream of widely
propagated email virus and worm attacks. While the major-
ity of these viruses and worms do not cause any data loss,
with many simply written for the virus- or worm-writer’s
amusement or to enable the writer to use other people’s
computers for ‘spam relays’, it is worth noting that any suc-
cessful attack gives access to the compromised computer,
potentially allowing all files to be compromised or erased.
The potential for real data loss is great; we should not be
lulled into a false sense of security simply because hackers
do not often take advantage of their attacks. There is a large
but stratified hacker society and culture with just a few very
technically knowledgeable and skilled hackers dedicated to
ferreting out new exploits; these leaders then package up
their exploits into easily executable cracking programs and
make them available to legions of novice but eager ‘script
kiddies’ who help enact large and widespread attacks. And
there have been real and significant cases of data loss. The
New York Times recently reported on a successful attack
involving hundreds of computers in government and acade-
mic research labs (‘Internet Attack Called Broad and Long
Lasting by Investigators’, New York Times Online, 10 May
2005 [http://nytimes.com]) that is a perfect example of why
we need something like the recommendations made below.
While the extent of the attack and any data loss is still being
investigated, a geophysics graduate student at University of
California, Berkeley had all her files and many emails erased
by this hacker. In another incident at UC Berkeley a bioin-
formatics lab was successfully hacked. Key data on several
machines were erased and permanently lost; the only backup
119.2 Genome Biology 2005, Volume 6, Issue 9, Article 119 Smith et al. http://genomebiology.com/2005/6/9/119
Genome Biology 2005, 6:119
Figure 1
The frequency of security events on a typical genomics server. (a) A plot of daily security-event counts for the first 198 days of 2002; the expanded
region had a large increase in daily counts. Attack attempts are an everyday occurrence and there can be large spikes in attack activity. (b,c) Aggregate
breakdown and relative proportions of the most common security events for, (b) days with small, regular event counts or (c) two days showing a
massive spike in events as evident on the graph in (a). For the two days with the massive spike a single event type “SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP”,
which is used in buffer overflow attacks (attacks that attempt to write past the legal boundaries of allocated computer memory) and thus is likely to
represent real and serious attack attempts, accounts for over 90% of events. For the more regular days there is no single dominating event, and it is not
clear whether these events are genuine attack attempts.
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was weeks old and progress was significantly impeded. Finally,
on the other side of the USA, the Dana Farber Cancer Institute
in Boston had a high-throughput sequencing machine success-
fully hacked, and data files and programs were deleted; these
were, fortunately, recovered from backup ( for details see
[http://research.dfci.harvard.edu/ news.html#hack]).
There are common and effective lines of defense, such as fire-
walls and antivirus software, but “security is a process, not a
product” (Schneier B: Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a
Networked World. New York: John Wiley; 2000): the most
important parts of a solution are vigilance, good policy and
planning, and attention to detail in a three-pronged strategy
of prevention, detection, and response. Fortunately, acade-
mia has it somewhat easier than the military, government,
and business, where security is generally a very serious busi-
ness - because of the free and open nature of academia, the
key requirement is not to prevent unauthorized access at all
costs, but rather to maintain the integrity and robustness of
data and scientific results and to ensure this for posterity. We
feel that the open nature of academic genomics research,
analogous to the open-source software movement, makes it
possible to make use of cooperative economies of scale to deal
effectively and efficiently with security.
Academia needs to explore the specifics and scale of how
best to aggregate security expertise, personnel, and
resources for the use and benefit of all. We believe there is
great potential in aggregation and we offer the following to
demonstrate the possibilities of what might be called ‘Open
Genomics’. Funding agencies such as the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) should set up working groups dedicated to
computer/network security issues, and should provide aid in
this area to government-grant-funded members of the acad-
emic community. We believe there are many positive things
such a working group could do, such as: provide security
guidelines, help documentation, and possibly even Linux
distributions, tailored specifically to the genomics commu-
nity; provide custom and third-party security scripts/pro-
grams, such as hardening scripts from the Bastille Linux
project [http://www.bastille-linux.org]; setup and monitor
intrusion-detection systems such as SNORT or via honey-
pots/honeynets and/or perform security scans using pro-
grams such as Nessus [http://www.nessus.org] and SARA
[http://www-arc.com/sara/] on community members’
machines, allowing community-wide attack patterns to be
detected; provide central hosting; and provide central
authentication, enabling distributed collaborations. Finally,
and most importantly, one can never fully prevent successful
attacks and it must be assumed that in the worst case every-
thing will be lost. Ultimately a security solution must be to
do the best you can to secure your computing infrastructure,
but, more importantly, to perform regular and redundant
backups that can be quickly and efficiently restored. Thus
universal backup, archival storage, and mirroring of commu-
nity resources are the most essential services such a working
group can provide, consistent with the key goal of security in
academia: to preserve data and results for posterity.
While it might seem a daunting task regularly to backup all
online genomics resources, in fact this is realizable today
without excessive difficulty or cost. Pointing the way are sites
such as Google [http://www.google.com], which maintains a
cache of the most recent crawling of most pages it indexes, and
the Internet Archive [http://www.archive.org], which goes
further and maintains an archive of the web’s pages at dif-
ferent time points, thus allowing one to view the history of
particular sites and how they have evolved over time.
Since most or all genomics resources are web-accessible, a
similar webcrawler-based solution could provide a simple,
‘rough-and-ready’ way to backup genomics resources. This
would require a lot of storage space, but space is relatively
cheap today: for example, Google offers free email
accounts with 2 gigabytes of storage to anyone. One
problem, however, is that most scientific webpages are not
static but are generated dynamically by programs access-
ing databases for user-submitted forms. It is estimated
this so-called ‘hidden web’ is 500 times the size of the
static web, and it is challenging to crawl it, but there is
some research and products addressing this that could be
leveraged (Mostafa J: Seeking better Web searches. Sci
Am 2005, 292:67-73.) 
The ideal solution would be to backup the databases and
programs used to generate content, or even better, the entire
‘virtual machine’ if virtualization software such as Vmware
[http://www.vmware.com] or Xen [http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/
Research/SRG/netos/xen/] were used; from these any
site’s full functionality can be reproduced. Given that these
programs and files in which data are stored are generally
not directly web-accessible, this would involve more user
intervention than simply having your site crawled. But, the
proposed working group could create custom-configurable
scripts that users could install in their web server’s executable
content area; these scripts would authenticate incoming
connections, only executing if the request comes from the
working group’s crawlers, and then run code to dump the
database’s content to a text file, and send it, as well as the
site’s programs, to the working group’s computer for
backup. Finally, any such backup webcrawlers would need
to know which sites to crawl, and there are various ways
this could be determined, such as crawling any sites associated
with PubMed [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Entrez] records
or having some kind of registration system whereby
researchers could, after authentication, register their site
to be crawled and backed up. Possibly systems such as
DSpace [http://www.dspace.org], which has been used to
create a digital archive of research documents at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) [http://dspace.mit.edu],
and the various ‘web services’ technologies, such as Uni-
versal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI)
[http://www.uddi.org/] and Simple Object Access Protocol
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(SOAP) [http://www.w3.org/TR/soap/], could be used to
help enable this.
In this short article, we have shown that attempted and suc-
cessful network attacks are fairly common in academic sci-
entific research. We suggested that the open nature of
academia allows it to address security issues cooperatively
and that funding agencies should set up working groups to
provide security services for the community. Finally, we
have suggested that a large-scale backup system be set up to
archive academia’s digital data and to ensure its integrity for
posterity. It is important to note that most of the data and
information about scientific research is now primarily stored
digitally; gone are the days when archiving of scientific
research amounted solely to physically storing lab notebooks
and copies of old journals. Digital data are more ephemeral
and, because modern technology allows information to be
generated at a much faster rate, the scale of digital informa-
tion is vastly greater than physically printed information
ever was – a fact that is causing headaches for the US gov-
ernment’s National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA), responsible for maintaining archives of all govern-
ment correspondence and records (Talbot D: The Fading
Memory of the State. Technology Review, July 2005
[http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/07/issue/
feature_memory]). Nevertheless, we feel it is more impor-
tant than ever to archive the record of scientific progress in
order to avoid the curse that “those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana G: Life of
Reason. Scribner’s; 1905:284). We sincerely hope that
governments and funding agencies give serious attention to
the issues raised in this article and implement systems for
addressing them along the lines suggested herein.
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